RCMG
← All posts

Every record crypto theft was a signing failure

Bybit, Radiant, DMM Bitcoin — the contracts held; the signer infrastructure didn't. What that pattern means for how treasuries should operate.

The largest thefts in crypto history share a detail that matters more than their size: in each one, the smart contracts were not the weak point.

The pattern

At Bybit, attackers compromised a developer machine at the wallet platform and served three multisig signers a doctored interface. Each signer confirmed a "normal transfer" on a hardware wallet. What they actually signed replaced the wallet's implementation contract. Roughly $1.46 billion moved in minutes.

At Radiant Capital, malware on the signers' own computers made a malicious transaction display as benign on their hardware wallets. The Safe contract itself was untouched.

At DMM Bitcoin, the attackers never touched the exchange — they hit its wallet software vendor through a fake recruiter message.

What it means

The blockchains held. The signing infrastructure didn't. The remedy isn't better contracts — it's treating signing as an operation:

  • Signer device hygiene — the signer's laptop is part of the attack surface
  • Off-device verification — decoded transaction data checked against intent on an independent screen
  • Timelocks and notice — large movements delayed long enough to be caught
  • Transaction visibility — every party able to see what is actually being signed, not just what a screen claims

The whitepaper covers this in full, including what a written signing policy looks like.

Blockchain & Web3 · custody · security · operations