The largest thefts in crypto history share a detail that matters more than their size: in each one, the smart contracts were not the weak point.
The pattern
At Bybit, attackers compromised a developer machine at the wallet platform and served three multisig signers a doctored interface. Each signer confirmed a "normal transfer" on a hardware wallet. What they actually signed replaced the wallet's implementation contract. Roughly $1.46 billion moved in minutes.
At Radiant Capital, malware on the signers' own computers made a malicious transaction display as benign on their hardware wallets. The Safe contract itself was untouched.
At DMM Bitcoin, the attackers never touched the exchange — they hit its wallet software vendor through a fake recruiter message.
What it means
The blockchains held. The signing infrastructure didn't. The remedy isn't better contracts — it's treating signing as an operation:
- Signer device hygiene — the signer's laptop is part of the attack surface
- Off-device verification — decoded transaction data checked against intent on an independent screen
- Timelocks and notice — large movements delayed long enough to be caught
- Transaction visibility — every party able to see what is actually being signed, not just what a screen claims
The whitepaper covers this in full, including what a written signing policy looks like.
